Smilingly supporting gross violations of international law and the UN Charter again and again. It is the US, stupid!
March 2, 2026
Here is all that EU Presidents von der Leyen and Costa had to say on February 28, 2026:
“The developments in Iran are greatly concerning. We remain in close contact with our partners in the region. We reaffirm our steadfast commitment to safeguarding regional security and stability.
Ensuring nuclear safety and preventing any actions that could further escalate tensions or undermine the global non-proliferation regime is of critical importance.
The European Union has adopted extensive sanctions in response to the actions of Iran’s murderous regime and the Revolutionary Guards and has consistently promoted diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the nuclear and ballistic programmes through a negotiated solution.
In close coordination with EU Member States, we will take all necessary steps to ensure that EU citizens in the region can count on our full support. We call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint, to protect civilians, and to fully respect international law.”
The near‑total silence from European leaders following the 28 February 2026 attack on Iran is striking, not least because the legal situation is unusually clear. The strikes were carried out without UN Security Council authorisation and without a credible claim of immediate self‑defence. Under any reasonable reading of the UN Charter, this constitutes a violation of international law. Yet European governments have avoided naming this reality. Their language has been limited to “restraint,” “concern,” and “de‑escalation”—phrases that carefully avoid the central legal and moral issue.
This silence is not a coincidence. It reflects a set of structural forces that have shaped European foreign‑policy behaviour for decades, especially when close allies act outside the law. The first of these forces is the deep entanglement of Europe’s security architecture with the United States. Even if the EU or Euro-NATO could defend itself, its political class has internalised the belief that strategic alignment with Washington must be preserved at any cost. Therefore, criticism of U.S. military action is treated as destabilising, even when the action itself destabilises the international order.
A second structural factor is the EU’s own institutional design. Foreign‑policy statements require unanimity among 27 states with divergent histories, threat perceptions, and political cultures. Some are strongly Atlanticist; some maintain close ties with Israel; others prioritise international law. Achieving consensus under these conditions almost always produces the lowest common denominator. Strong legal language becomes politically impossible, even when the facts demand it. As I wrote in an analysis about 20 years ago, the EU is not geared to make peace.
A third driver is the political cost of naming illegality. To say that an ally has violated the UN Charter is not merely rhetorical. It implies obligations: pressure for sanctions, suspension of arms exports, parliamentary scrutiny, and diplomatic consequences. European governments avoid this because it forces them into actions they do not wish to take. By framing events as “complex,” they avoid triggering the mechanisms that international law would otherwise require.
A fourth factor is Europe’s credibility dilemma. The EU has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine using the strongest legal vocabulary available. If it applied the same standards to U.S. or Israeli actions, it would expose its own double standards. This is, of course, nothing but a selective application of norms and ethics. And reveals a fundamental lack of ethics and a principled policy.
A fifth structural element is the nature of EU–Israel relations. Beyond political sympathy, Europe maintains deep economic, technological, and intelligence ties with Israel. These ties create additional caution. Many governments also frame their relationship with Israel through historical responsibility – ad absurdum, given what Israel does – making them reluctant to issue strong public criticism even when they disagree privately.
The widening government-people gap in foreign and security politics
Finally, there is the widening gap between European publics and their governments. Across the continent, majorities oppose escalation, support adherence to international law, and express solidarity with civilians caught in conflict. The reaction to the genocide in Gaza shows this with abundant clarity. Yet foreign policy remains insulated from public pressure. Decisions are made within small circles of diplomats and security officials who prioritise alliance management over alignment with public sentiment. The result is a growing sense of democratic dissonance: citizens see the illegality clearly, while leaders speak in euphemisms.
In other words, it is becoming increasingly problematic that democracy does not apply to foreign and security policy-making. A few European leaders can meet and decide what they want; the citizens can only protest. Additionally, the leadership of the EU is not the result of democratic voting; they have been appointed and many – if not most – of them relate to the narrow groupthinking Military-Industrial-Media-Academic Complex, MIMAC, which represents another non-democratic actors in this policy field.
It is difficult not to get the feeling that European leaders, in their de facto supportive response to the U.S.–Israeli attack, prioritise alliance ties over the security and peace interests of their own citizens—citizens who undoubtedly view the aggression through a more legal and principled lens than their governments appear willing to acknowledge.
This is intellectually and morally troubling. Europe claims to be a defender of international law, yet it hesitates to speak when the law is broken by its closest partner.
This is what the EU should have stated
It is important to be constructive and not just critical. So, for the purpose of illustrating a truly diplomatic and law‑anchored approach, I hereby put forward the text of an EU Statement that we have every right to expect that the EU leadership had had the moral and intellectual capacity to state:
“The European Union condemns the military strikes carried out against Iran on 28 February 2026. These actions were undertaken without authorisation from the United Nations Security Council and without a credible basis in the right of self‑defence as defined under the UN Charter. They therefore constitute a serious violation of international law and pose a grave threat to regional and international stability.
The EU’s position is guided by principles, not by preferences for any government. The Union has long expressed deep concern about the nature of governance in Iran, including systemic violations of human rights and the absence of democratic accountability. However, no matter how one views the authorities in Tehran, unilateral military action, targeted killings, or externally imposed regime change cannot under any circumstances be accepted as instruments of international conduct.
The EU expresses its solidarity with the people of Iran, who now face heightened danger and uncertainty. Their safety, dignity, and fundamental rights must be protected. The EU cannot accept a world in which powerful states act outside the law. International law applies to all, without exception. The protection of civilians, the prevention of regional war, and the integrity of the multilateral system require an immediate end to hostilities and a return to diplomacy.“
Simple as that.
