This is the first in a series of TFF PressInfos about Kosovo. It follows PressInfo 208 about the United Nations praising the potential war criminal, former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj. Relevant background links for this series are available separately.PressInfo #208 – The
UN in Kosovo praisespotential war criminal – why?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As Kosovo marks these very days the anniversary of the massive anti-Serb violence of March 2004, the path toward talks on its final status appears set.
The mainly Albanian-populated province of southern Serbia has extradited its Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj — indicted for war crimes during the Kosovo conflict — to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Belgrade is doing the same with its own former generals indicted for war crimes during the conflict, thereby paving the way for a positive stance by Brussels on its EU Feasibility Study.
The roadblocks toward a true, negotiated and long-lasting agreement on Kosovo remain numerous. However, they should by no means prevent the international community and the main parties in conflict from finding a solution to what remains the most unstable zone of 21st century Europe.
Crafting a viable agreement requires rejecting solutions based on maximalist demands. An intensive PR campaign launched by the pro-Albanian lobby is attempting to persuade the world that independence for Kosovo — immediate or conditional after a year or two — is the only available solution for regional stability.
This option neglects the objections of non-Albanian communities in the province — primarily the Serbs — and especially Serbia, of which Kosovo remains a province under international law. Undermining Belgrade’s role in finding a compromise would be a crucial mistake that could destroy hopes for a negotiated settlement and indefinitely prolong regional instability.
As the entire region moves toward a “borderless Europe,” creating new borders appears archaic, anti-European, outdated and dangerous.
This Series Will Address
- Why Kosovo matters not only for the people there and the region, but globally.
- The conflict in the media — during the 1990s, the 1999 bombing, and today. Why were Kosovo Albanians more successful in the media war?
- Preconditions for any settlement.
- The Serbian perspective — rarely presented in mainstream media.
- Belgrade’s minimum conditions for a viable solution.
- Why arguments for quick, full independence lack credibility and may serve other purposes.
- An international media strategy for Serbia and Serbs.
- Future possibilities and positive scenarios — illustrating that there is never only one solution.
TFF’s Background and Approach
TFF published its first report, Preventing War in Kosovo, in 1992 — long before many others engaged seriously with the issue. The International Crisis Group’s first report on Kosovo came in December 1999, after the bombing.
We believe that had comprehensive and impartial efforts toward negotiated solutions been undertaken in the early 1990s, the local war, the manipulated Rambouillet “negotiations,” and the 1999 bombing might have been avoided. Those events only increased the psycho-political distance between the parties — whereas professional conflict management seeks to reduce it.
TFF’s professional principle is clear:
We analyze and mitigate conflicts; we do not impose solutions.
Conflicts belong to those who fight them; solutions should also belong to them. Outsiders can only assist parties in finding mutually acceptable solutions.
Whether Kosovo becomes independent, remains within Serbia-Montenegro, or adopts another arrangement is not our professional concern. What matters is that a conflict is solved only when:
a) The parties themselves accept the new order and feel ownership of both process and outcome.
b) They do so voluntarily — not under pressure or threat.
c) The conflict does not return in the same or similar form — meaning the solution is sustainable and does not generate trauma or revenge.
d) The solution itself does not spark new conflicts elsewhere.
There are troubling signs that these criteria may not be respected.
Perhaps it is time to correct past mistakes and look forward together — including the international “community,” which has often acted more as participant than mediator in Balkan conflicts.
A Few Words on Conflict Management and the International Community’s Role
Politics and media focus on one issue at a time. Events surface and disappear. Principles applied in one conflict may differ from those applied in another. Long-term memory — of 15, 5, or even 1 year — is increasingly rare in our overloaded “information” society, which is neither an “understanding” nor a “deliberation” society.
Why has the international community reached a political and intellectual cul-de-sac six years after bombing allegedly intended to facilitate a solution?
To deny that Kosovo could have been handled better is to forgo learning lessons for future conflict management. It fosters a dangerous mentality: since we did what we did, it must have been right; therefore we continue. If Kosovo fails to develop as predicted, silence follows — and blame shifts elsewhere.
Within what might be called the Western MPM Complex (military–politico–media), conflicts are often framed as binary: one good side and one bad side. Conflicts are attributed to bad actors rather than structural and historical complexities.
Solutions are expected quickly — even when conflicts have hardened over decades or centuries.
Thus, self-appointed but professionally untrained conflict managers draft peace plans, demand signatures, and threaten punishment. Cultural arrogance accompanies the assumption that Western actors are more civilized and thus entitled to interpret conflicts, define truth, and impose solutions.
This intellectual construction contradicts peace research and negotiation theory. It ignores complexity and treats countries in ways known to fail at the psychological level.
The idea that international actors may themselves be participants — pursuing interests through others’ conflicts — is often dismissed as conspiracy thinking. Yet it deserves serious examination.
Why Is Kosovo Important Beyond Kosovo?
- It was the test case for “humanitarian intervention” — peace by violent means. Similar philosophy was later applied in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Does it work?
- The 1999 bombing occurred without UN Security Council mandate but led to UN leadership in post-war administration.
- Per capita, it is the largest and most expensive peace-building mission ever.
- The solution will influence EU and NATO integration processes.
- EU militarization accelerated after Kosovo. Europe felt humiliated by U.S. dominance.
- Kosovo sets a precedent for secessionist movements worldwide.
- Any solution will affect regional stability — including Republika Srpska, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and others.
- Serbia hosts Europe’s largest refugee/IDP population — many expelled from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.
- Kosovo’s criminal economy (smuggling, trafficking, drugs) is among Europe’s densest per square kilometre.
- Independence would require discussion of compensation to Serbia for sanctions, destruction and territorial loss.
- Kosovo tests Western credibility on human rights and minority protection.
- Kosovo Albanians understandably view Western intervention as implicit support for independence. Delivering that dream risks new conflicts; breaking perceived promises risks unrest.
Why Is Kosovo Important Right Now?
March 17, 2005 marked the first anniversary of the anti-Serb riots of 2004. Many interpret this as a sign that Kosovo-Albanian patience is running out. Observers believe extremist elements remain armed and capable of destabilizing the province.
Despite 20,000 NATO troops and thousands of civilians, a relatively small minority can exert significant psycho-political pressure.
The international community also faces competing crises, notably Iraq.
Former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj is now in The Hague. Many Albanians see him as a hero. Six Serb generals have voluntarily gone to The Hague, and Belgrade has extradited those indicted.
Summer 2005 will evaluate Kosovo’s compliance with international standards. UN leadership anticipates Kosovo will pass and that final status talks will begin in September — lasting months, not years.
A “quick fix” appears to be in the air.
Pro-independence advocacy continues internationally.
The Kosovo drama approaches its final stage. Responsible actors must ask: What are the chances of a happy ending? And if small, what defines the least unhappy one?
To be continued.
© TFF PressInfo Series
