Expansion of NATO, Conflicts in the Balkans and the Security of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

NATO enlargement – for what?

The process of NATO enlargement has a great potential to influence significantly the security and sovereignty of Yugoslavia, and this trend will probably both continue and intensify in the future. The members of NATO and the Partnership for Peace program exercised a most significant influences upon the conflicts in Yugoslavia and in some of the neighboring countries; these conflicts, on the other hand, effect the security and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. However, it seems that to the extent to which NATO armament alone was not able to stop communism (without a parallel activity of the civic society) on the European continent, it is equally not capable (alone) of eliminating ethnic conflicts (that determine the sovereignty and security of not only Yugoslavia, but practically also of all other states in the Balkans and in Central and Eastern Europe as well) after the end of the Cold War. Relatively large stocks of armaments and big armies do not represent new phenomena in the Balkans. Some analyses show that – when compared with the members of the Warsaw Pact, in Eastern Europe, the European NATO members, developing countries and developed countries – the Balkan countries used to hold the first position in 1987 in regard to the number of soldiers per 1000 inhabitants, and in 1990 they held the second position. The economic burden of military expenditure in an average Balkan country was in 1987 ranked as third, and in 1990 as the first one. For the years after 1990 there are only estimates. However, available data show a rise of military expenditures in the territory of the second Yugoslavia (especially in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia). During the last few years in a number of the former Yugoslav republics it became obvious that it can happen that those who are trying to preserve peace by preparing for war can achieve not what they were aiming at, but what they were preparing for. Not long after they began to produce the atomic weapons, the Americans have made an unpleasant discovery – that such a gigantic quantum of military force, did in itself not bring lasting greater security. Since the Soviets managed to achieve a rough military parity, the whole concept of armament build-up entered an impasse. In other words, it can be concluded that the increase in quality and quantity of military force that is at a state’s disposal does not necessarily bring more security. Ex-Yugoslavia: the futility of armed security The second Yugoslavia is an illustration to this point: the Yugoslav People’s Army was counted among the strongest in Europe and yet, the conflict and war could not have been avoided by the presence of military stocks. Security- related studies show that the Balkans became an even more dangerous area than before. This is accentuated by a lack of continued communication and cooperation (but, primarily of tolerance) between nations and states. Instead of relying upon communication, patience and readiness for cooperation, the Balkan states rely upon well equipped armies; their populations seem to be ready to make great sacrifices in order to achieve political aims that were designed by the political elites of the respective countries. Therefore, the question is whether NATO soldiers and weapons can bring them more security. The greatest dangers for peace is that states posses huge military power which some leaders are tempted to use rather than enter political dialogue; these dangers can also be generated by systematic behavior that is in accordance with a narrow understanding of an old Roman maxim, si vis pacem, para bellum. However, this proverb does not say anything about what preparations for war should look like. It seems that a modern interpretation of the mentioned principle should include a few more elements aimed towards a non-violent preservation or establishment of peace: peace-oriented diplomacy, peace-oriented politics and communications, economy and – one would say, in the first place – peace education. Deterrence by military weakness and creative strength Deterrence by military weakness (and not strength) is compatible with communications that do not aim at demonizing one nation in the minds of the other; they tend rather toward promoting mutual understanding and particularly toward communications that contribute to the transparency of the world in general. In other words, deterrence by military weakness is in accordance with the politics that does not lead countries and nations into wars, but rather inhibits them in this regard; it’s compatible with diplomacy that does not use military power as an ‘argument’ but relies much more upon diplomatic skills, wisdom, creativity, ability, education and inventiveness. Finally, deterrence by military weakness is in favor of economic prosperity. Weak states and strong ethnic identity The process during which many new states emerged in Eastern and Southeastern Europe was from the very beginning burdened by historical considerations, frustrations and traumas. Therefore, the sovereignty of some of these states remained disputable also after they achieved independence and international recognition. Due to many internal problems (primarily economic underdevelopment, social, ethnic and religious fragmentation, weak or broken state traditions and a lack of democratic ethos), these states can be qualified as weak ones in the sense in which this notion is elaborated by Barry Buzan and some other authors. One of the crucial problems is that the power of ethnic identification is strengthened by the lack of other uniting forces in the society. Comparison of ethnic complexity in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and in Western Europe led one author to the conclusion that in Western Europe, too, there could be found ‘all types of ethnic groups’. The difference is that the majority of West European monarchies have possessed the political, military, economic and cultural power to subordinate different minority ethnic groups, assimilating them in time. France represents an example for such a kind of modernized and centralized monarchy, while neighboring Spain – incapable of turning Basques and Catalans into Spaniards – is facing some of the problems that exist in Eastern Europe, and especially in the first and second Yugoslavia. It is concluded that the ‘key to the explanation is resting with the political power, and in this respect the East European countries were much weaker than their European partners’. Peaceful co-existence requires something different The impossibility to create (completely) ‘pure’ national states in the territory of Central and Eastern Europe, and it seems particularly in the Balkans, ‘condemns’ the members of two or more ethnic groups to live in one state, namely to share these states in a certain way. Therefore, the most important task of the states in the Balkan region is to acquire such knowledge that is necessary for life in circumstances in which there exist ethnic conflicts, and to face them without using violence. The elimination of ethnic conflicts in the Balkans will probably be a lasting process; the danger is the establishment of undemocratic rule with the aim to maintain state sovereignty at any cost. The endeavor to increase security by expanding NATO deserves attention primarily because membership in NATO is possible only if the potential member had prior disengaged from conflicts with the neighbors. Conflicts in the territory of the second Yugoslavia could not and can not be eliminated in the short run, neither by using domestic armies, police and similar forces (even during the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia), nor by humanitarian activities of UNPROFOR units, nor by actions for establishing peace by force. Peace cannot be restored and secured by IFOR and SFOR units, and conflicts cannot be prevented by the somewhat similar activities of UNPREDEP in Macedonia. The weak state fuels repression – and becomes weaker… The new states have undergone a process in which they perpetuated their weaknesses, as illustrated by tensions within the political system. By their consequences – i.e. a general weakening of the respective societies and states (except, maybe, in the military sense) – the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia can be compared only with the consequences of World War II in this region. They showed how inadequate the military is when it comes to the solution of the three key groups of problems of the Yugoslav state, and her ‘new’ neighbors: ethnic conflicts, perpetuation of state weaknesses (which is underlined by participation in conflicts), as well as the problems which emerge due to intensification of ethnic identification. This conclusion can, at least partly, be drawn from the analysis of the state schemes, as presented by Barry Buzan. In the view of this author, namely, the first element of this scheme is the very notion of state – when firmly planted in the minds of the populations, it creates a firm basis for the state as a whole, and if firmly planted in other states, it creates a safe environment for the state in question. The second element is the institutional dimension of the state, and its monopoly over the use of force. Nowadays, there are two trends in this development: first, the rise in number of institutions and, second, the field of their activity becomes broader and broader. It seems that, for a theoretical handling of the issues pertaining to Yugoslavia and some neighboring countries (and maybe some other states in Central and Eastern Europe), it is significant to understand that the lack of social consensus in regard to the state idea was frequently compensated by a strengthening of the mentioned institutional element. However, one of the most significant characteristics of weak states is exactly the fact that they most frequently make an attempt to strengthen the institutional element by strengthening the repressive and some other related segments of their apparatus. On the other hand, stressing the significance of the institutions that exercise repressive and similar functions does rather weaken and not strengthen the respective state. In such states, security related discussions give priority to internal threats, and the lack of legitimacy of the regime is ‘solved’ only by a temporary alleviation of social conflicts, while the roots of the problem are completely ignored. Confict-resolution through new institutions and the rule of law The basic problem is that a weak state cannot be strengthened by repression, so that the circle is being closed: more repression brings more weakness and – this weakness ‘asks’ for more repression… Therefore, none of the states that fit the descriptions of weak states can easily solve their problems that stem from ethnic conflicts and identification, and from weaknesses in their sovereignty and security; they cannot even be significantly alleviated by (non)admission to membership of any military-political alliance. What they need is the establishment of stable and legitimate institutions. Finally, one should mention that the institutionalization of politics, establishing of the rules of the political ‘game’ and establishing the rule of law (instead of rule of parties, and even individuals) should remain the basic mechanisms for solving or mitigating ethnic and other conflicts. It is only in such a case that the state itself also becomes a mechanism for limiting conflicts. The cases of Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and some other multi-ethnic states indicate that potentially it is realistic to presume that – at least in the elementary sense – it is possible to unite the societies in which ethnic and political divisions had grown so high that they could lead to a questioning of the very idea of the state, its institutions and sovereignty, and thereby its very existence.